

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8904

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, XG

SUBJ: CSCE: MBFR LINKAGE

BONN HOLD FOR COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
HARTMAN

REF: (A) USNATO 5945

(B) USNATO 5946

1. SUMMARY. REFTELS SUGGEST THAT SITUATION IN CSCE, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR INFLUENCING COURSE OF EVENTS HERE, ARE NOT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY SOME SPC REPS OR BY NATO IS. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS MISLEADING TO THINK IN TERMS OF POSSIBLE "CONCESSIONS" WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE IN CSCE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN MOVEMENT BY EASTERN SIDE IN VIENNA. RATHER, NATO DISCUSSIONS SHOULD, IN OUR VIEW, FOCUS ON POSSIBILITIES FOR CONTROLLING PACE OF PROGRESS ON CSCE, IN RELATION TO PROGRESS IN MBFR. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD OFFER  
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POSSIBILITIES FOR LEVERAGE ON SOVIETS WHICH ARE

REALISTIC AND SOULD NOT CALL INTO QUESTION SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS ON CSCE ISSUES. FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE INTENDED ONLY TO CLARIFY THE OPTIONS REALISTICALLY AVAILABLE, AND NOT REPEAT NOT TO MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING REVERSE LINKAGE. END SUMMARY.

1. PARA 5 OF IS DRAFT IN THIS ISSUE (REF B) IS UNREALISTIC IN SAYING ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO AGREE ON PRECISELY WHAT PROPOSALS THEY WERE PREPARED TO MAKE IN CSCE TO GET A GIVEN RESULT IN VIENNA. NOR IS IT A MATTER OF CHOOSING, AS CANADIAN SPC REP SUGGESTED (PARA 5 REF A), BETWEEN "ABANDOING WESTERN DESIDERATA" AND A "SLOWDOWN" IN GENEVA.

2. WE SERIOUSLY DOUBT THERE EXISTS ANY CLEAR-CUT DEFINITION OF THE AIMS OF INDIVIDUAL ALLIED DELEGATIONS COVERING ALL THE MAJOR CONTENTIOUS ISSUES HWERE -- MUCH LESS A COLLECTIVE ALLIED CONSENSUS ON THE MATTER. SOME DELEGATIONS FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT CERTAIN PARTICULAR ISSUES, BUT NONE COULD DEFINE IN ADVANCE WHAT KIND OF OVERALL OUTCOME IT WOULD ULTIMATELY SETTLE FOR. SUCH JUDGEMENTS WILL NECESSARILY EMERGE ONLY IN FINAL PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. THERE IS THEREFORE NO REPEAT NO BENCHMARK AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE THE "CONCESSIONS" MENTIONED IN PARA 5 OF IS PAPER. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN BASKET III, WHERE NUANCES OF LANGUAGE ARE THE STUFF OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. (IT MIGHT BE LESS TRUE OF CBM'S WHEN THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUES WILL ULTIMATELY REDUCE THEMSELVES TO A MATTER OF NUMBERS).

3. REALISTICALLY, WITH RESPECT TO BASKET III ISSUES NOT ALREADY VIRTUALLY SETTLED OR IN AN ADVANCED STATE OF NEGOTIATION, THERE ARE:  
A) AN OPENING WESTERN POSITION, USUALLY IN THE FORM OF AN EC-NINE PAPER; B) ONE OR MORE UNWRITTEN AND UNDEFINED FALBACK POSITIONS (EXPECT WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN SET OUT IN THE "MORE REALISTIC TEXTS" WHICH WE ARE ENCOURAGING THE ALLIES TO AGREE  
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UPON); C) AN ULTIMATE FALBACK POSITION THAT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO JUDGE IN ADVANCE. THE POINT HERE IS THAT CSCE COULD BE SLOWED DOWN IF THE ALLIES SIMPLY HOLD ON LONGER THAN THEY MIGHT OTHERWISE DO TO THEIR INTITAL BASKET III FALBACK POSITIONS (POINT B IN THE ABOVE SCHEME). WHEN THE SOVIETS COMPLAIN, HINTS COULD BE DROPPED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ALLIED APPROACH IN GENEVA

AND THE SLOW PACE IN VIENNA. THEN IF THE EASTERN BLOC MAKES THE REQUISITE GESTURES IN VIENNA, ALLIES COULD MOVE THEN TO THEIR FINAL FALBACK POSITION (POINT C). THAT POSITION WOULD BE THE SAME, WITH OR WITHOUT LINKAGE. WITH LINKAGE, WE COULD SIMPLY TAKE LONGER TO GET THERE. PARA 5 OF THE IS PAPER SHOULD, WE SUGGEST, BE REWRITTEN TO REFLECT THIS.

4. NOR DO THE ALLIES NEED ARTIFICIALLY TO SLOW DOWN CSCE STAGE II, AS SUGGESTED BY CANADIAN SPC REP (PARA 5 REF A). THEY NEED ONLY TURN A DEAF EAR TO EASTERN PROPOSALS TO SPEED UP THE GENEVA TALKS, WHICH SIMULTANEOUSLY MAKING ALLUSIONS TO THE DEADLOCK IN VIENNA. IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT IF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE GO ON AT THEIR CURRENT SNAIL'S PACE, STAGE II COULD EASILY RUN INTO MID - 1975 OR BEYOND WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL FOOTDRAGGING BY ANYBODY.

5. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE PRINCIPLES DECLARATION, WE HAVE ONLY "PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED" SIX OF TEN PRINCIPLES. WE HAVE MET ABOUT FORTY TIMES ON PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND STILL HAVE NOT FINISHED IT. EVEN AFTER THE TEN PRINCIPLES ARE PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED, A "SECOND READING" WILL BE NEEDED TO CLEAR UP MUCH BRACKETED LANGUAGE IN THE PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED TEXTS. AND DISCUSSIONS AHVE YET TO BEGIN ON PREAMBLE TO PRINCIPLES DECLARATION OR ON ITS FINAL CLAUSES.

6. THE ASSUMPTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT AT A GIVEN MOMENT, THE PACE OF WORK HERE WOULD QUICKEN, PERHAPS CONFIDENTIAL

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FOLLOWING A SUBSTANTIVE BREAKTHROUGH IN BASKET III, AND THAT THE DRAFTING WOULD THEREAFTER GO FORWARD MUCH FASTER ON PRINCIPLES AND OTHER ISSUES. THIS COULD EASILY BE ACCOMPLISHED, BUT IT WOULD REQUIRE CONSCIOUS EFFORTS TO CHANGE PRESENT WORK METHODS, DECISIONS TO ORGANIZE MORE SMALLY, INFORMAL SESSIONS AND SO ON.

7. IN SUM, ALLIES WOULD NOT HAVE TO ACT TO SPIN OUT THE GENEVA TALKS. THEY COULD SIMPLY REFRAIN, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, FROM JOINING FULLY IN EFFORTS TO SPEED THEM UP.

8. TO OPTIONS SUGGESTED BY NETHERLANDS REP (PARA 7 REF A), WE THUS SUGGEST THAT TWO MORE BE

ADDED: A) ALLIES HOLD FIRMLY TO THEIR SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS ON SELECTED BASKET III AND CBM ISSUES, DELAYING CONCESSIONS UNTIL SOVIETS ARE MORE FORTHCOMING IN VIENNA; B) ALLIES WOULD BE LESS THAN FULLY RESPONSIVE, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, TO EASTERN PLEAS TO COOPERATE IN MAKING PROCEDURAL ADJUSTMENTS ESSENTIAL TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF STAGE II, NOTING, IN RESPONSE TO EASTERN APPROACHES, THE SLOW PACE OF PROGRESS IN VIENNA.

9. WE DO NOT UNDERSTIMATE THE DIFFICULTY OF PERSUADING THE ALLIES TO FOLLOW, IN PRACTICE, EITHER OF THE ABOVE COURSES. INDEED, WE ASSUME THE ARTIFICIALLY "ANTI-LINKAGE" CAST OF THE IS DRAFT REFLECTS AN UNDERLYING ALLIED DISTASTE FOR LINKAGE. WE DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE IS PAPER SHOULD STATE THE OPTIONS MORE FAIRLY.

10. WHILE WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT SUGGEST POINT SHOULD BE MADE TO ALLIES, DEPT AND USNATO SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT MOSCOW COULD VERY QUICKLY ALL BUT FORCLOSE THE OPTION OF USING CSCE STAGE II TALKS AS LEVERAGE ON MBFR BY MAKING A FEW CONCESSIONS IN BASKET III. FOR EXAMPLE, IF SOVIETS SHOW ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY ON THE HUMAN CONTACTS PACKAGE NOW BEING PUT TOGETHER (SEE SEPTEL ON CSCE HIGHLIGHTS)

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TO CONCLUDE A DEAL IN A WEEK OR TEN DAYS, THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE EVEN LESS STOMACH FOR DOING ANYTHING HERE TO BRING PRESSURE ON SOVIETS IN VIENNA.  
ABRAMS

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## Message Attributes

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